(New York Post) During his State of the Union address in March, President Biden announced an ambitious American initiative to get more aid into the Gaza Strip — a $230 million floating pier off the coast of the war-torn territory.
Biden explained that the Joint Logistics Over The Shore pier “would enable a massive increase in the amount of humanitarian assistance getting into Gaza every day.”
It didn’t.
Barely a week into the operation, four US Army boats broke free from their moorings and floated off. One washed up on an Israeli beach.
To make matters worse, the ship sent to extract the stuck vessel also found itself beached as bemused beachgoers looked on.
Three days later, the Pentagon announced that the causeway had broken off in heavy seas, and the whole pier would have to be floated to Ashdod in Israel for repairs.
It took until June 7 to reopen the pier, but 10 days later, it was again floated to Ashdod because of sea conditions. The pier was returned to Gaza, but was again removed on June 29.
The whole project could be shut down this month, well ahead of schedule.
Even when it has been functional — which has been the exception, not the rule — much of the aid delivered from the pier is piling up on the shore anyway, after Palestinians stopped picking it up over accusations the IDF used the pier area to extract four hostages and the commandos who rescued them.
The project — announced during the president’s premier address and involving 1,000 troops — was a public failure for the US.
It did not address the problem for which it was designed, was possibly counterproductive, and was entirely inappropriate for local, predictable conditions.
Was that an isolated fiasco, the product of bum luck and an admirable willingness to take risks to urgently get more aid to civilians?
Or does the episode serve as an apt metaphor for the Biden administration’s policies throughout the Israeli war on Hamas — overly ambitious, ineffective and out of touch with the realities on the ground?
Since the Hamas invasion and slaughter in southern Israel on October 7, US goals have not entirely aligned with those of Israel.
“There’s an interest in the security of Israel,” said Daniel Byman, senior fellow at CSIS and professor at Georgetown University. “But the US has defined that differently than the Israeli government.”
Americans have focused more on Israel’s international standing and what Gaza looks like years down the road, arguing that continued military action doesn’t necessarily make Israel more secure in the long term.
“In the absence of a plan for the day after, there won’t be a day after,” US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in May, warning that continued Israeli refusal to advance a viable plan for the post-war management of Gaza will lead to a never-ending war in the enclave.
He has also argued repeatedly that “genuine security” for Israel depends on a pathway toward a Palestinian state.
The Biden White House has pressing regional concerns, which would all be served by a rapid conclusion of the war in Gaza. It wants to protect shipping in the Red Sea, which has been badly disrupted by Houthi attacks from Yemen.
Washington is eager to find a way to end the escalating Israel-Hezbollah cross-border conflict, one that has the potential to spiral into a regional conflict with Iran that the US is determined to prevent.
Ending the fight in Gaza would also allow the Biden administration to make a concerted push to realize its grand vision for the Middle East — a normalization agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia, and a US-Saudi defense pact.
And, of course, there is the issue of Biden’s own political survival. Even before his disastrous June 27 debate performance, the president was trailing challenger Donald Trump consistently in swing states.
Biden needs every vote he can muster, and he has been trying to dull the anger of progressives and Arab-Americans over his support for Israel.
Some, like Byman, see Biden’s handling of those competing interests as reasonable.
“Iran is trying to keep its role and that of its allies real but limited,” he said. “I think part of that is due to the US, the threats of US retaliation.”
Byman continued: “The perception of most US security figures is that Israel has tipped the balance — from hitting Hamas hard, to making marginal gains without much to show for it — in ways that are hurting Israel in their international opinion, and in particular, making it hard to have any longer-term solution.”
Yet even if there have been some US policy successes around the war — not to mention apt warnings about humanitarian aid and actively preparing for a post-Hamas Gaza — there are pressing questions about the effectiveness and even the coherence of US policy since October 7.
Three days after the attack, Biden famously warned Iran and its proxies that if they were considering “taking advantage of this situation, I have one word: Don’t. Don’t.”
They did.
Hezbollah has been firing at Israel since October 8, and more than 60,000 Israelis have been internally displaced as a result. Iran launched a massive drone and missile attack on Israel in April.
The Houthis in Yemen and Iran-backed Shiite militias in Iraq have also launched strikes at Israel.
None seem too concerned about any potential retaliation from the US.
The Biden administration has attacked the Houthis directly at the head of an international naval coalition.
But Operation Prosperity Guardian has been ineffective. Houthi attacks have become more destructive and lethal as the months go by, and ships continue to avoid the Red Sea, driving up costs and disrupting global supply chains.
Biden has also thrown significant diplomatic and intelligence muscle behind efforts to reach a ceasefire-for-hostages deal between Israel and Hamas.
